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The question has arisen, on many occasions, about when a candidate for 
public office in Florida is considered “officially elected.”1  Governors have 
requested opinions from the Supreme Court of Florida on the issue, since 
judicial vacancies occurred for various reasons, and the governors were un-
sure of whether they had the authority to appoint replacements or whether 
they had to wait for the election process to select them.2  In addition, county 
supervisors of elections have requested opinions determining the specific 
date a candidate is elected, from either the Florida Attorney General or Flori-
da Department of State Division of Elections, for various other elected offic-
es.3  This article will review the Florida Constitution, Florida Statutes, advi-
sory opinions, and case law in an attempt to determine, with as much speci-
ficity as possible, the date when a candidate for public office in Florida is 
considered officially elected. 
I. FLORIDA ELECTIONS AND THE SUNSHINE LAW 
 The word “election,” when standing alone, is defined as the 
act of choosing; choice; the act of selecting one or more from oth-
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 1. See, e.g., Advisory Op. to the Governor re Sheriff & Judicial Vacancies Due to Res-
ignations, 928 So. 2d 1218, 1220–21 (Fla. 2006); see also 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 1 
(2010) (letter from Donald L. Palmer, Dir., Div. of Elections, to The Honorable Deborah 
Clark, Pinellas Cnty. Supervisor of Elections, July 26, 2010), available at 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/new/2010/de1009.pdf. 
 2. E.g., Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 
3d 795, 796 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam); Advisory Op. to the Governor re Appointment or Elec-
tion of Judges, 983 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 2008). 
 3. See 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 1–2. 
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ers.  Hence, appropriately, the act of choosing a person to fill an 
office or employment by any manifestation of preference, as by 
vote, uplifted hands, or viva voce.4 
Once elected, the candidate becomes a “candidate elect” and, therefore, 
subject to Florida’s Sunshine Law, which prohibits members of the same 
elected body (board, commission, council, etc.) from discussing matters that 
may foreseeably come before that elected body for a vote.5  As soon as the 
candidates-elect become subject to the Sunshine Law, they are also subject to 
penalties for violating it.6  However, there must be proof of scienter for there 
to be a criminal violation of the Sunshine Law.7  As a result, a violation 
could not occur by accident.8 
Some may question why a candidate, immediately upon being elected, 
is subject to the Sunshine Law.  Why not wait until the individual takes the 
oath of office, and actually begins his term?  That seems logical, and would 
obviously avoid the issue about which date controls when the candidate be-
comes subject to the Sunshine Law. 
That issue was addressed by the Third District Court of Appeal in the 
case of Hough v. Stembridge.9  Following a special election in the City of 
North Miami Beach, meetings were held between an incumbent councilman 
who was elected mayor, and two other individuals who were elected to the 
office of city council but were not incumbents.10  One of the meetings took 
place before the individuals had taken their respective oaths of office.11  The 
  
 4. Alexander v. Booth, 56 So. 2d 716, 719 (Fla. 1952) (citing State v. Hirsch, 24 N.E. 
1062, 1063 (Ind. 1890); Brown v. Phillips, 36 N.W. 242, 247 (Wis. 1888)). 
 5. See FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (2012); Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288, 289–90 
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or 
authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision, except as otherwise 
provided in the Constitution, including meetings with or attended by any person elected to 
such board or commission, but who has not yet taken office, at which official acts are to be 
taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution, rule, 
or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting.  The 
board or commission must provide reasonable notice of all such meetings. 
FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (emphasis added). 
 6. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(3); see Pub. Officers-Elect & Sunshine Law, 74-40 Fla. Op. 
Att’y Gen. 1 (1974). 
 7. Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969); see also FLA. 
STAT. § 286.011(3). 
 8. See Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969); see also FLA. 
STAT. § 286.011(3). 
 9. 278 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1973). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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trial court found that all three individuals had violated Florida Statutes sec-
tion 286.011.12 
The appellants argued that the trial court erred in ruling that they had 
violated the statute since the first meeting between them took place when 
two of them were councilmen-elect, and only one of them was an elected 
official subject to the statute.13  Consequently, they claimed that they were 
not members of a governing body subject to the Sunshine Law.14 
The court stated: 
 
 We find the position untenable to hold on the one hand that 
Florida Statute[s] [section] 286.011 is applicable to elected board 
or commission members who have been officially sworn in and on 
the other hand inapplicable to members-elect who as yet merely 
have not taken the oath of public office.  An individual upon im-
mediate election to public office loses his status as a private indi-
vidual and acquires the position more akin to that of a public trus-
tee. 
 Therefore, we hold that members-elect of boards, commis-
sions, agencies, etc. are within the scope of the Government in the 
Sunshine Law.  To hold otherwise would be to frustrate and vi-
olate the intent of the statute which “having been enacted for the 
public benefit, should be interpreted most favorably to the pub-
lic.”15 
As stated previously, the Sunshine Law does not apply to candidates for 
office prior to the date on which they are considered elected, “unless the 
candidate is an incumbent seeking reelection.”16  However, it would not nec-
essarily be considered a violation of the Sunshine Law if an incumbent can-
didate in attendance at a candidates’ forum expressed his or her opinion on a 
matter that “may foreseeably come before” that elected body for a vote.17  
Furthermore, a non-incumbent may express his opinion on a matter that 
could foreseeably come before the elected body for a vote as long as there 
was no discussion taking place between an incumbent and another member 
of the board who happened to be in attendance at the forum.18 
  
 12. Id. at 289–90 (citing FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1); Canney v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 278 
So. 2d 260, 263 (Fla. 1973)). 
 13. Id. at 289. 
 14. Hough, 278 So. 2d at 289. 
 15. Id. at 289–90 (quoting Canney, 278 So. 2d at 263); see also FLA. STAT. § 286.011. 
 16. Sunshine Law, Candidates’ Night/Political Forum, 92-05 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 2 
(1992); see also FLA. STAT. § 286.011. 
 17. 92-05 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 2; see also FLA. STAT. § 286.011. 
 18. 92-05 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 2. 
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II. DATE OF ELECTION 
The most logical date a candidate could be considered elected is the 
date of the general election,19 assuming there was more than one candidate 
who qualified for the race, votes were counted, and a winner declared.  But 
what about a candidate who qualified for the seat, but ran unopposed, wheth-
er or not he was the incumbent?  Would it be the date the qualifying period 
ended, the date of the election, the date the election results are certified as 
official, or the date the term begins?  Unfortunately, a 2010 Supreme Court 
of Florida advisory opinion, discussed below, complicated the issue.20 
Florida Statutes section 100.041 details how various Florida officials 
shall be elected and in one case, when an officer of one elective office—
county commissioner—is considered elected.21  It would be an overstatement 
to consider it the definition of clarity.22 
Florida Statutes section 100.041(2)(a) provides that “[a] county com-
missioner is ‘elected’ for purposes of this paragraph on the date that the 
county canvassing board certifies the results of the election pursuant to 
s[ection] 102.151.”23  However, no mention is made of when other officers 
listed in that section are considered elected.24 
What is puzzling about the language in Florida Statutes section 
100.041(2)(a) is that, according to the court in Morse v. Dade County Can-
vassing Board,25 (1) the county canvassing board does not have “standing to 
challenge . . . election results,” and (2) the circuit court does not have juris-
diction unless there is a challenge to “an election result filed by [either] a 
candidate or an elector qualified to vote in the election.”26 
Although Florida Statutes section 102.112(2) provides that a canvass-
ing board must certify the results by the twelfth day after the general elec-
  
 19. See FLA. STAT. § 100.031. 
A general election shall be held in each county on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in 
November of each even-numbered year to choose a successor to each elective federal, state, 
county, and district officer whose term will expire before the next general election and, except 
as provided in the State Constitution, to fill each vacancy in elective office for the unexpired 
portion of the term. 
Id. 
 20. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d 
795, 798 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam). 
 21. FLA. STAT. § 100.041, 100.041(2)(a). 
 22. See id. § 100.041. 
 23. Id. § 100.041(2)(a). 
 24. See id. § 100.041. 
 25. 456 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
 26. Id. at 1314; see also FLA. STAT. § 100.041(2)(a). 
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tion, it can do so before then.27  Consequently, a county commissioner from 
one county could be considered elected at a time different than a county 
commissioner from another county, even though the election was held on the 
same day and the results were clear.28  That result would appear to conflict 
with Florida Statutes section 97.012(2), which mandates “uniform standards 
for the proper and equitable implementation of the registration laws.”29  The 
Morse decision, coupled with both Florida Statutes section 97.012(2), and 
the fact that the various county canvassing boards can meet at different 
times, mandates a careful review of the language in Florida Statutes section 
100.041(2)(a).30 
The question about when an unopposed candidate is considered elected 
is even more unsettled.  Florida Statutes section 101.151(7) provides:  “Ex-
cept for justices or judges seeking retention, the names of unopposed candi-
dates shall not appear on the general election ballot.  Each unopposed candi-
date shall be deemed to have voted for himself or herself.”31  The implication 
is that the unopposed candidate voted for himself or herself at the general 
election and not at any other time during the election process, such as on the 
date the qualifying period ended, or on the date of the primary election.32  
Therefore, is the person elected on that date, or on the date the canvassing 
board meets to certify the election results? 
III. JUDICIAL VACANCIES 
The Supreme Court of Florida further muddied the waters in an advi-
sory opinion to Governor Charlie Crist in 2010.33  Although the advisory 
opinion concerns a judicial vacancy and is specific to the facts of the case, it 
complicated the matter for the Florida Department of State, which renders 
advisory opinions to Florida Supervisors of Elections and other interested 
parties regarding when a candidate is considered elected.34 
  
 27. See FLA. STAT. § 102.112(2). 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. § 97.012(2).  Compare id. § 102.112(2), with id. § 97.012(2). 
 30. See FLA. STAT. §§ 97.012(2), 102.112(2), 100.041(2)(a); Morse, 456 So. 2d at 1314–
15. 
 31. FLA. STAT. § 101.151(7). 
 32. See id. 
 33. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d 
795, 798 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam). 
 34. See id.; 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 1–2 (2010) (letter from Donald L. Palmer, 
Dir., Div. of Elections, to The Honorable Deborah Clark, Pinellas Cnty. Supervisor of Elec-
tions, July 26, 2010), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/new/2010/ 
de1009.pdf. 
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In that case, incumbent Escambia County Court Judge David Ackerman 
qualified for the seat on April 28, 2010.35  The qualifying period ran from 
noon on April 26, 2010 to noon on April 30, 2010.36  Since no other candi-
date qualified, the judge was unopposed at the time the qualifying period 
ended.37 
Judge Ackerman’s current term was to expire on January 3, 2011, with 
his new term beginning on January 4, 2011.38  However, he submitted a res-
ignation letter to Governor Crist on May 24, 2010, which was accepted by 
the Governor on May 28, 2010.39  That resignation created a judicial vacancy 
that would last for approximately seven months—until his new term began 
on January 4, 2011—if the Governor could not name a replacement prior to 
the date of the election.40  To compound the uncertainty, Judge Ackerman 
stated that he would not “resume his judicial duties until February 1, 2011.”41 
The first question that must be answered is when the vacancy occurred.  
Article X, section 3 of the Florida Constitution states: 
 Vacancy in office shall occur upon the creation of an office, 
upon the death, removal from office, or resignation of the incum-
bent or the incumbent’s succession to another office, unexplained 
absence for sixty consecutive days, or failure to maintain the resi-
dence required when elected or appointed, and upon failure of one 
elected or appointed to office to qualify within thirty days from the 
commencement of the term.42 
Consequently, the vacancy created by Judge Ackerman’s resignation oc-
curred on the date Governor Crist accepted the resignation, May 28, 2010.43 
Unfortunately, the Florida Constitution contains two sections that ad-
dress “judicial” vacancies.44  Article V, section 11(b) states: 
  
 35. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d at 
795–96. 
 36. Id. at 795. 
 37. Id. at 796. 
 38. Id. at 795. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d at 
796. 
 41. Id. 
 42. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 43. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d at 
795, 796. 
 44. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 10(b)(1)–(2), 11(b). 
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 The governor shall fill each vacancy on a circuit court or on a 
county court, wherein the judges are elected by a majority vote of 
the electors, by appointing for a term ending on the first Tuesday 
after the first Monday in January of the year following the next 
primary and general election occurring at least one year after the 
date of appointment, one of not fewer than three persons nor more 
than six persons nominated by the appropriate judicial nominating 
commission.  An election shall be held to fill that judicial office 
for the term of the office beginning at the end of the appointed 
term.45 
On the other hand, article V, section 10(b)(1) provides that: 
 The election of circuit judges shall be preserved . . . unless a 
majority of those voting in the jurisdiction of that circuit approves 
a local option to select circuit judges by merit selection and reten-
tion rather than by election.  The election of circuit judges shall be 
by a vote of the qualified electors within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the court.46 
Section 10(b)(2) states the same for county judges, substituting the term “cir-
cuit” with “county.”47 
The Supreme Court of Florida previously determined that how a judicial 
vacancy should be filled depended upon when the vacancy occurred.48  The 
vacancy would be filled by appointment if it occurred before the qualifying 
period began and would be filled by election if the vacancy occurred after the 
election process began.49  The court determined that the election process be-
gan at the beginning of the statutory qualifying period.50  That date was cho-
sen to promote consistency in the process of filling judicial vacancies, since 
it was a fixed point marking the commencement of the election process.51 
In Judge Ackerman’s case, the court stated that since his candidacy 
  
 45. Id. § 11(b). 
 46. Id. § 10(b)(1). 
 47. Id. § 10(b)(2). 
 48. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Sheriff & Judicial Vacancies Due to Resignations, 
928 So. 2d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 2006) (citing Advisory Op. to the Governor re:  Appointment or 
Election of Judges, 824 So. 2d 132, 136 & n.9 (Fla. 2002)). 
 49. Id. (citing Advisory Op. to the Governor re:  Appointment or Election of Judges, 824 
So. 2d at 136). 
 50. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Appointment or Election of Judges, 983 So. 2d 526, 
529 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Advisory Op. to the Governor re Sheriff & Judicial Vacancies Due to 
Resignations, 928 So. 2d at 1221). 
 51. Id. at 530 (citing Advisory Op. to the Governor re:  Appointment or Election of 
Judges, 824 So. 2d at 136). 
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was uncontested, pursuant to section 105.051 [of the] Florida Sta-
tutes, he was deemed elected to serve as a judge on the Escambia 
County Court for the term beginning January 4, 2011.  Thus, this 
particular election process ended on April 30, 2010, when the qua-
lifying period ended, and no individual other than Judge Ackerman 
can now fill the vacancy by election.52 
The language in Florida Statutes section 105.051(1)(a) is similar to the 
language in Florida Statutes section 101.151(7).53  Section 105.051(1)(a) 
states:  “The name of an unopposed candidate for the office of circuit judge, 
county court judge, or member of a school board shall not appear on any 
ballot, and such candidate shall be deemed to have voted for himself or her-
self at the general election.”54  Once again, the implication is that the unop-
posed candidate voted for himself or herself at the “general election,” and not 
at any other time during the election process.55  If the legislature did not in-
tend for the date of the general election to be the determining date for elec-
tion of an unopposed candidate for office, it could have so stated by provid-
ing a different date.  It did not.56 
The court continued: 
[A]n incumbent office holder resigned after the election process 
had effectively concluded.  A vacancy was thus created at a time 
when the election process had ceased.  There is no issue here with 
regard to preserving the right of the people to elect county court 
judges.  Instead, the issue is whether an incumbent judge who had 
been reelected without opposition may then retire from office and 
leave a judgeship vacant for an extended period before resuming 
the duties of the office when it is convenient for him to do so.57 
IV. CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS POSITION 
The Supreme Court of Florida distinguished the Ackerman case from 
others that it had addressed previously regarding whether a judicial vacancy 
  
 52. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d 
795, 797 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see also FLA. STAT. § 105.051(1)(a) 
(2012). 
 53. Compare FLA. STAT. § 105.051(1)(a), with FLA. STAT. § 101.151(7). 
 54. FLA. STAT. § 105.051(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. §§ 101.151(7), 105.051(1)(a), 105.051(1)(c). 
 57. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d at 
797. 
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should be filled by appointment or election.58  The Ackerman decision also 
appears to contradict both an earlier supreme court opinion and an earlier 
attorney general opinion concerning when a “county commission” candidate 
is elected.59 
In opinion 74-293, the attorney general was asked to answer the follow-
ing four questions posed by the attorney for Clay County.60  Only the first 
three are relevant to the issue presented here:  (1) Whether “a county com-
missioner [must] be a resident of the . . . district in which he [was] elected;” 
(2) whether he must be a resident at the time of election or at the time he 
qualified for the position; (3) when the candidate must become a resident of 
the district to which he was elected, if not at the time of qualifying; and (4) 
whether “the name of [the] candidate . . . [must] be removed from the ballot 
if it [was] determined that [he] did not reside in the district [to] which he 
[was] elect[ed] at the time” he qualified for the position.61 
The attorney general relied on article VIII, section 1(e), of the Florida 
Constitution, which provides: 
(e) Commissioners.  Except when otherwise provided by county 
charter, the governing body of each county shall be a board of 
county commissioners composed of five or seven members serving 
staggered terms of four years.  After each decennial census the 
board of county commissioners shall divide the county into dis-
tricts of contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as prac-
ticable.  One commissioner residing in each district shall be 
elected [by the electors of the county].62 
  
 58. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re Appointment or Election of Judges, 983 So. 2d 
526, 529–30 (Fla. 2008) (holding that a vacancy created “during a qualifying period in which 
any candidate qualifies for the judicial office is to be filled by election” where the vacancy 
arose due to the involuntary retirement of a county court judge during the qualifying period); 
Advisory Op. to the Governor re Sheriff & Judicial Vacancies Due to Resignations, 928 So. 
2d 1218, 1219–20 (Fla. 2006) (holding that vacancy occurred when the Governor accepted the 
resignation of a circuit court judge on April 14, 2006, and that because the vacancy was 
created before the qualifying period commenced on May 8, 2006, the position was to be filled 
by appointment); Advisory Op. to the Governor re:  Appointment or Election of Judges, 824 
So. 2d 132, 135–36 (Fla. 2002) (holding that a vacancy created when a judge involuntarily 
retired after the conclusion of the qualifying period—in which the incumbent judge did not 
qualify for election but three other candidates did qualify—was to be filled by election). 
 59. Compare Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 
So. 3d at 796–98, with State v. Grassi, 532 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 1988), and Residency 
Requirements for Cnty. Comm’rs, 74-293 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 1–3 (1974). 
 60. 74-293 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 1. 
 61. Id. 
 62. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, the attorney general concluded, in the answer to the second ques-
tion posed in opinion 74-293, that “a candidate did not have to meet the resi-
dence requirements at the time of qualifying for office.”63 
However, the attorney general raised an interesting caveat in the answer 
to the second question, which could obviously pose other problems for a 
candidate.64 
[T]he execution of the candidate oath at a time when the candidate 
is not a resident of the appropriate district raises the possibility of 
conflict with statutory provisions relating to false swearing and 
perjury and, therefore, the suggested practice would be for a can-
didate to establish his residence in the appropriate district prior to 
qualifying for office.65 
In response to the third question posed in opinion 74-293, the attorney 
general stated: 
[T]he language of [article VIII, section 1(e) of the Florida Consti-
tution] requires residence in the appropriate county commission 
district as of the day of the election.  Accordingly, in order to be 
sure of complying with this constitutional provision, a candidate 
should establish his residence in the district he seeks to represent 
by no later than the day before the election.66 
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court of Florida reinforced the deci-
sion reached in opinion 74-293.67  In State v. Grassi,68 William Grassi was 
charged with violating a statute imposing residency qualifications.69  Grassi 
intended to run for Broward County commissioner in District 4, but decided 
to run in District 3 when he “learn[ed] that the seat in District 4 was not 
open.”70  Grassi was charged 
with knowingly and unlawfully qualifying as a candidate for Bro-
ward County Commissioner, District 3, without being a resident 
thereof, in violation of section 99.032, Florida Statutes (1983).  
Section 99.032 requires that “[a] candidate for the office of county 
  
 63. 74-293 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 3. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. (citations omitted). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See State v. Grassi, 532 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 1988). 
 68. 532 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1988). 
 69. Id. at 1055. 
 70. Id. 
10
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commissioner shall, at the time he qualifies, be a resident of the 
district from which he qualifies,” violation of which is a first-
degree misdemeanor.71 
The trial court held that section 99.032 was inconsistent with article 
VIII, section 1(e) of the Florida Constitution and dismissed the case against 
Grassi.72  The district court affirmed the order to dismiss.73  The supreme 
court approved the district court’s ruling, stating, “if article VIII, section 
1(e), of the Florida Constitution provides qualifications for the office of 
county commissioner, the legislature is prohibited from imposing any addi-
tional qualifications.”74  The court concluded by stating that “[t]he Florida 
Constitution requires residency at the time of election.  Therefore, section 
99.032 [of the] Florida Statutes is unconstitutional as it imposes the addi-
tional qualification for the office of county commissioner of residency at the 
time of qualifying for election.”75 
The Supreme Court of Florida, based upon its decision in Grassi, con-
firmed that a candidate for county commission was not considered elected on 
the date he qualified for the position.76 
With that decision in hand, the obvious question is why the Supreme 
Court of Florida decided that Ackerman was considered elected after the 
qualifying period ended without any other candidate having qualified.  The 
decision is especially puzzling considering that it appears to conflict with 
Florida Statutes section 105.051(1)(a), as previously stated.77  It may have 
something to do with the reason behind Ackerman’s resignation coupled 
with his intention to reclaim his seat on his own terms.78  In other words, the 
court may have sent a message to all public officials who wanted to use the 
system to their own advantage. 
  
 71. Id. at 1055–56 (second alteration in original); see also FLA. STAT. § 99.032 (1983) 
(repealed 1991). 
 72. Grassi, 532 So. 2d at 1056; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e); FLA. STAT. § 
99.032. 
 73. Grassi, 532 So. 2d at 1056. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (emphasis added); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §1(e); FLA. STAT. § 99.032. 
 76. See Grassi, 532 So. 2d at 1056. 
 77. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text; see also FLA. STAT. § 105.051(1)(a) 
(2012); Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d 795, 
796–98 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam). 
 78. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d 
at 797–98. 
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According to published reports, Ackerman resigned so he could collect 
a lump sum retirement payout of nearly $1.3 million.79  He informed the 
same reporter that he intended to return to the bench “next year” as a result 
of his de facto reelection.80  However, if he returned to the bench before an 
unspecified date in 2011, he would be required to return the lump sum pay-
ment.81 
With that in mind, the court made it clear that it did not appreciate what 
it may have perceived as Judge Ackerman’s attempt to manipulate the sys-
tem, especially when it had a negative impact on the citizens Judge Acker-
man was sworn to serve.82  “The consideration that must predominate here is 
the right of the people of Escambia County to the services of a county judge 
when the incumbent has presented himself to the people for reelection but 
then has laid aside the duties of his office.”83  The court continued by stating, 
“[a] judgeship is not an office that may be temporarily forsaken at will for 
personal benefit.  When a vacancy arises from such circumstances, the Gov-
ernor may properly fill the vacancy by appointment pursuant to article V, 
section 11(b).”84 
The “from such circumstances” portion of the last sentence quoted 
above seems to indicate that the situation was unique, and if the circums-
tances warrant, a different outcome may be in the offing.85  Nevertheless, the 
decision that an unopposed candidate was deemed elected at the conclusion 
of the qualifying period has compounded the problem for those who provide 
opinions on such matters such as the Florida Attorney General and the Flori-
da Department of State Division of Elections.86 
  
 79. Kris Wernowsky, Judge’s Quick Exit Nets $1.3 Million, PENSACOLA NEWS J., May 
27, 2010, at 1A. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d 
at 797–98. 
 83. Id. at 797 (citing In re Advisory Op. to the Governor (Judicial Vacancies), 600 So. 2d 
460, 462 (Fla. 1992)). 
 84. Id. at 798 (emphasis added); see also FLA. CONST. art. V, §11(b). 
 85. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d 
at 798. 
 86. See id. at 797; see also 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 2 (2010) (letter from Donald 
L. Palmer, Dir., Div. of Elections, to The Honorable Deborah Clark, Pinellas Cnty. Supervisor 
of Elections, July 26, 2010), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/new/ 
2010/de1009.pdf; Requirements for Qualification for Legislative Office, 72-224 Fla. Op. 
Att’y Gen., 384–85 (1972). 
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V. MOST RECENT ADVISORY OPINION 
A July 26, 2010 letter from the Division of Elections highlights the di-
lemma faced by those who render opinions on election matters.87  The Pinel-
las County Supervisor of Elections requested an interpretation of the Election 
Code as it pertained to when state legislators and county commissioners were 
considered elected.88 
The Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections asserted that it was logical 
that a candidate be considered “officially elected on the date when the elec-
tion results are certified as official.”89  The Division of Elections’ response 
highlighted the uncertainty created by the Ackerman decision:  “While this 
may be a proper conclusion under some circumstances, it is not possible or 
practicable for the Division to definitively establish this as the election date 
for all purposes under the Election Code.”90 
Addressing the Ackerman decision, the Division of Elections stated that 
when a candidate is considered elected depends on the facts presented.91  
“[A] candidate could be deemed elected on Election Day, on the date when 
the final canvassing board certifies the election results, on a date specified by 
a court in an election case, or some other date as dictated by the particular 
factual circumstances at issue.”92 
A candidate elected on the date that the canvassing board meets to certi-
fy the results of the election is impractical, “consider[ing] that an ‘election’ . 
. . trigger[s] . . . deadlines and activities that occur both before and after Elec-
tion Day.”93 
  
 87. See 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 1–2. 
 88. Id. at 1. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1, 2 (emphasis added). 
 91. Id. at 2, 4; see also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10; FLA. STAT. § 100.181 (2012). 
 92. 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 2. 
 93. Id. at 3; see also FLA. CONST. art. III, § 3(a) (stating that the legislature shall convene 
“[o]n the fourteenth day following each general election . . . [for] organization and selection of 
officers”); FLA. STAT. § 101.68(2)(a) (2009) (amended 2011) (“The county canvassing board 
may begin the canvassing of absentee ballots at 7 a.m. on the sixth day before the election, but 
not later than noon on the day following the election.”); FLA. STAT. § 101.657(d) (2009) 
(amended 2011) (“Early voting shall begin on the 15th day before an election and end on the 
2nd day before an election.”); FLA. STAT. § 97.053(6) (2006) (amended 2007) (stating that a 
“provisional ballot shall be counted . . . if the applicant presents evidence . . . sufficient to 
verify [certain information provided on the application by] 5 p.m. of the second day following 
the election”). 
Obviously, these constitutionally and statutorily-mandated activities depend on an election tak-
ing place on a date certain, and that date being Election Day.  If an election ends when the re-
sults are certified, it would be meaningless for a voter applicant to submit information to verify 
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The Division of Elections letter concludes by providing that it may be 
practical, although not legal, to consider a candidate as being elected when 
the results are certified.94  As a matter of fact, opinion 82-26 by the Division 
of Elections opined that very fact.95  Unfortunately, “[h]owever, the Florida 
Constitution, Florida Election Code, and related authorities conclusively 
establish that a candidate may be deemed ‘elected’ on another day, e.g., the 
day of an ‘election’ under a particular factual situation.”96  “In fact, section 
100.181 [of the Florida Statutes] entitled ‘Determination of person elected,’ 
without mentioning the certification of results, merely states:  ‘The person 
receiving the highest number of votes cast in a general or special election for 
an office shall be elected to the office.’”97 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is imperative that the uncertainty surrounding when a candidate for 
public office in Florida is considered elected be resolved.  That should be 
done, not only for the candidates, but also for the Division of Elections, the 
county supervisors of elections, and city and county attorneys charged with 
advising candidates and elected officials about what may constitute a viola-
tion of the Florida Sunshine Law, among other things. 
The uncertainty should, and could, be easily remedied if the Florida 
Legislature simply reviewed the various election statutes and made them 
consistent, or simply wrote an additional election statute that addressed the 
issue.98  Of course, it is essential that any new statutes, or amendments to 
existing statutes, do not conflict with the Florida Constitution.99  In addition, 
  
his or her application on the second day following the election, or to allow the county canvass-
ing board to begin canvassing absentee ballots on the day following the election. 
10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 3. 
 94. 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 3–4; see also FLA. STAT. § 100.181. 
 95. 82-26 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections (1982) (letter from Div. of Elections to Mr. Martin J. 
Hanna, Assistant City Attorney, City of Coral Gables, Nov. 10, 1982), available at http:// 
election.dos.state.Fl.us/opinions/new/1982/de8226.pdf. 
 96. 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 3–4; see also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11; FLA. STAT. § 
105.051(1)(c); Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 
3d 795, 796 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam). 
 97. 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 4 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 100.181). 
 98. See Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288, 289–90 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 1973) (ex-
amining the interpretation of FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1)); see also 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elec-
tions 3–4. 
 99. See State v. Grassi, 532 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 1988); see also FLA. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1(e). 
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a constitutional amendment would also be in order if there were provisions in 
the Florida Constitution that conflict with one another.100 
Finally, the answer to when a candidate for public office in Florida is 
considered officially elected can be boiled down to the first two words a 
first-year law student learns when asked a question…“it depends.” 
  
 100. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re:  Appointment or Election of Judges, 824 So. 2d 
132, 136 (Fla. 2002). 
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